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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae listed in the Appendix are professors of federal
jurisdiction who teach and write about the justiciability doctrines
informed by Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, especially the
law governing standing to sue. Amici hold a diverse range of views
concerning the appropriate contours of the Supreme Court’s standing
jurisprudence. Moreover, amici take no position here on the merits of
the constitutional challenge to the “individual mandate” created by
section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–49 (2010).
Instead, amici come together in this case to offer our views on two
points with respect to which we have common cause: First, the
Commonwealth of Virginia does not have standing to pursue the instant
suit. Second, the district court’s reasoning to the contrary, see Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010),

1. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), the parties have consented to
the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no counsel for a party (nor a party itself) made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission
of this brief. No person other than amici or their counsel made a
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
1
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cannot be reconciled with extant jurisprudence, and would likely wreak
substantial havoc on standing doctrine — if not on the appropriate role
of the federal courts more generally.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is a settled proposition that states do not have standing to sue
the federal government as parens patriae of their citizens. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976) (per curiam). This
rule results from the logical and legal reality that, where federal rights
are concerned, “it is the United States, and not the state, which
represents [citizens] as parens patriae.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 486 (1923); see also Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444
(4th Cir. 2002).
The Mellon rule is not just an infrequently revisited footnote to
the Court’s modern standing jurisprudence; rather, its ratio decidendi
reflects a specific variation on a familiar (and fundamental)
constitutional theme, i.e., that the Constitution’s structural guarantees
exist to protect individuals, and not the sovereignty of the states as
such. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575–77 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). To that end, and as a long line of post-Mellon
2
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cases reinforce, states suffer no freestanding injury simply because
Congress has allegedly exceeded its Article I powers.
Even as the Supreme Court has identified additional
circumstances in which states might have a “quasi-sovereign” interest
in suing private entities or other states on behalf of their citizens, it has
never recognized a “quasi-sovereign” interest sufficient to justify suits
challenging the constitutional scope of federal regulation. Instead, it
has repeatedly reaffirmed the “critical difference between allowing a
State ‘to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes’
(which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its
rights under federal law (which it has standing to do).” Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co.,
324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945)) (emphasis added).
Nor is there anything to the argument that these settled
precedents can be distinguished because of the conflict between the
individual mandate and the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010). To be sure, the Supreme Court has
recognized a state’s sovereign (not “quasi-sovereign”) interest in “the
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the
3
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relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and enforce a
legal code, both civil and criminal.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982). But this interest
goes only to a state’s power to ensure that its (valid) laws are followed
by those who are bound to comply. Manufacturing a conflict with
federal law cannot of itself create an interest sufficient to support
standing, since the state law creating the conflict will have no bearing
whatsoever on the constitutional validity of the federal regulation.
Because the district court rested Virginia’s standing on the mere
existence of a conflict between federal and state law, and identified no
freestanding injury to any other quasi-sovereign or proprietary interest,
its holding allows for no principled distinction between this suit and any
other in which a state would use preemption as the basis for standing,
even where the state’s objection sounded purely in the applicability of a
federal statute rather than its constitutionality.
Instead, such a holding would provide an all-too-effective end-run
around Mellon, since it would reduce the Supreme Court’s bar on parens
patriae suits against the federal government to cases in which there is
no state law with which the challenged federal action could be in
4
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tension. In addition, to the extent that Mellon reflects deeper principles
about Article III standing, including the bar on generalized grievances
and the requirement that the plaintiff suffer a concrete, particularized
injury, a rule that allows states to sue the federal government whenever
there is a conflict between state and federal law would risk vitiating
those requirements altogether in any instance in which a conflict is
alleged to exist. Finally, and perhaps counterintuitively, allowing states
to sue in virtually any instance of conflict with federal law would both
interfere with the ability of individuals to vindicate their rights and
short-circuit the principal means through which majorities have
traditionally exercised control over the scope of federal power — at the
ballot box.
To affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Act suffices to
confer standing upon Virginia would reward a state’s effort to nullify
federal law, incentivize future such endeavors by any state that believes
itself to be similarly aggrieved, and thereby involve the federal courts in
an enterprise that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement was
specifically intended (and has long been interpreted) to keep them out
of. As Professor Bickel warned, “It would make a mockery . . . of the
5
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constitutional requirement of case or controversy . . . to countenance
automatic litigation — and automatic it would surely become — by
states situated no differently” than Virginia is here. Alexander M.
Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89–90.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE RULE THAT STATES LACK STANDING TO SUE THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AS PARENS PATRIAE REFLECTS FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Just as members of Congress are not the appropriate parties to

enforce the separation of powers, see, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
(1997), so too the states are not the appropriate party to challenge the
constitutional scope of federal regulation, see, e.g., Mellon, 262 U.S. 447.
This is so “not because the interests asserted are unreal or inadequately
particular to the state, but because by hypothesis they should not, in
such circumstances, suffice to invoke judicial action.” Bickel, supra, at
88. Indeed,
There would be n othing irrational about a system that
granted standing in these cases; some European
constitutional courts operate under one or another variant of
such a regime. But it is obviously not the regime that has
obtained under our Constitution to date. Our regime
contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts . . . .

6
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Raines, 521 U.S. at 828 (citations omitted). Such a “more restricted”
role “lies in the protection [judicial review] has afforded the
constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority
groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action.” United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Critically, “[i]t is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of
the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for
the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the
countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic
principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis
rests.” Id.
This conception of the role of the federal courts in turn depends
upon litigation in which parties sue to protect their concrete,
particularized interests. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
739–40 (1972) (“[I]f any group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could
initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual
citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not also be
entitled to do so.”); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,
555 (1979) (“Under our constitutional framework, federal courts do not
7
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sit as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord
with their own conceptions of prudent public policy.”).
a. It is Settled Precedent that States May Not Sue the
Federal Government to Vindicate the Rights of Their
Citizens
One manifestation of these background principles is the venerable
rule that states may not sue the federal government merely to vindicate
the individual rights of their citizens. See, e.g., Pennsylvania, 426 U.S.
at 665 (“It has . . . become settled doctrine that a State has standing to
sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated
and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its
citizens . . . .”). As Justice Sutherland explained for a unanimous Court
in Mellon,
It cannot be conceded that a state, as parens patriae, may
institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United
States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the
state, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity
for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or
power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations
with the federal government. In that field it is the United
States, and not the state, which represents them as parens
patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and
to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for such
protective measures as flow from that status.

8

Case: 11-1057

Document: 40-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 15

262 U.S. at 485–86 (citation omitted); see Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158,
162 (1922) (holding that Texas’s claim that Congress exceeded its
enumerated powers “does not present a case or controversy within the
range of the judicial power as defined by the Constitution”); see also
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S.
328 (1926).
Thus, Massachusetts v. Mellon rejected Massachusetts’ standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the Sheppard-Towner (or
Maternity) Act of 1921, which provided matching federal funds for
private programs designed “to reduce maternal and infant mortality,”
262 U.S. at 478–79, on the ground that the Act interfered with state
regulation in violation of the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 479.
Similarly, in Texas v. ICC, Texas sought to challenge the
constitutionality of key provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920, on
the ground that they exceeded Congress’s powers to regulate interstate
commerce, see 258 U.S. at 160. Again, the Court rejected the state’s
standing to proceed absent a showing of a more concrete and direct
injury to Texas’s sovereign interests. See id. at 162.

9
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Comparable claims were made — and dismissed — in Florida v.
Mellon and New Jersey v. Sargent. In the former case, Florida sought to
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from collecting certain taxes
imposed by section 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926, on the ground that
the taxes exceeded Congress’s powers under Article I, Section 8. The
Court rejected Florida’s standing, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon for the
proposition that “there is no substance in the contention that the state
has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, any direct
injury as the result of the enforcement of the act in question.” 273 U.S.
at 18. And Sargent, like Texas v. ICC before it, held that challenges to
the scope of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause were not
properly brought by states absent some showing that some unique state
interest was implicated. See 269 U.S. at 337–39.
The origins of the rule for which these cases stand can easily be
found in nineteenth-century doctrine, in which “states could not (in
federal court) ordinarily litigate against the federal government or other
states conflicting claims to regulate, nor could they seek to enforce their
own legislation or to vindicate their extrastatutory interests in
protecting their citizenry.” Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins,
10
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State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 393 (1995). And although
Massachusetts v. Mellon itself arose in the context of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, in which special considerations might enter
into play, see Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603 n.12; see also id. at 610–12
(Brennan, J., concurring), it is now well-settled that its constraints
apply just as much to suits — such as this one — initially filed in the
lower federal courts. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 490–91; see
also Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16; Hodges, 300 F.3d at 444.
b. Fundamental Constitutional Principles Mandate that
the Federal Government Acts as Parens Patriae Where
Federal Law is Implicated
As the Court emphasized in Massachusetts v. Mellon, the impetus
behind the bar on state standing in these circumstances is the practical
and legal reality that it is the federal government, and not the states,
which acts as parens patriae where federal rights are concerned. See,
e.g., Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485–86; accord. Georgia, 324 U.S. at 446.2
Moreover, as Professors Woolhandler and Collins have explained,

2. Thus, there is no analogous bar on suits by the federal
government to enforce federal law against the states, their officers, or
private parties.
11
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The Court’s acceptance of an individual’s ability to raise
structural constitutional issues in contests with
governments may be due at least in part to the
nonrecognition of a sovereign’s right to litigate such
questions. This preference for having individuals rather than
government police even structural guaranties expresses that
individuals are the intended beneficiaries of those
guaranties.
Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 440 (footnote omitted). So understood,
Massachusetts v. Mellon is not just an infrequently revisited footnote to
the Court’s modern standing jurisprudence; rather, its ratio decidendi
reflects a specific variation on a familiar (and fundamental)
constitutional theme:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States
for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract
political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials
governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution
divides authority between federal and state governments for
the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an
end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575–77 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
a. Mellon Confirms that States Do Not Suffer a
Freestanding Injury Whenever Congress Exceeds its
Article I Powers
12
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Inasmuch as Mellon and its successors reflect the principle that
individuals are the intended beneficiaries of the Constitution’s
structural guarantees, they also stand for the related but distinct
proposition that states do not suffer a freestanding legally cognizable
injury whenever Congress exceeds its Article I powers.3 In Mellon itself,
“the complaint of the plaintiff state is brought to the naked contention
that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several states by
the mere enactment of the statute.” 262 U.S. at 483; see id. (“[I]t is plain

3. Thus, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the
Supreme Court upheld South Carolina’s standing to contest whether
Congress had the power under the Fifteenth Amendment to impose
“preclearance” requirements on particular jurisdictions for future
changes to local and state election laws, but rejected its ability to
challenge the Voting Rights Act on due process and bill of attainder
grounds. As the Court explained, South Carolina could raise the
Fifteenth Amendment claim entirely because the Fifteenth Amendment
(unlike the other constitutional provisions invoked by South Carolina)
directly and uniquely governed the federal government’s relationship
with the states as such. See id. at 324; see also Woolhandler & Collins,
supra, at 492 (“Presumably the state sought to litigate its own liberty
interest in setting voter qualifications, as provided by specific provisions
of the Constitution that expressly contemplate state power to set such
qualifications.”); accord. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119–25 (1970)
(Black, J.) (explaining why the Constitution creates a concrete interest
on the part of the states in the allocation of control over election
procedures). And even on those hyper-narrow terms, South Carolina
has still met with rather harsh criticism. See, e.g., Bickel, supra, at 88–
90.
13
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that that question . . . is political, and not judicial in character, and
therefore is not a matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial
power.”). Nor did it matter to the Court that Massachusetts alleged that
“the ulterior purpose of Congress thereby was to induce the states to
yield a portion of their sovereign rights.” Id. at 482. So too, in Texas v.
ICC, Florida v. Mellon, New Jersey v. Sargent, and a host of other,
similar cases. In short, “For purposes of litigation with the United
States (through the officers charged with execution of federal laws), a
state should have no recognizable interest in ensuring the fidelity o f
Congress to constitutional restraints.” Bickel, supra, at 88.4
Although it would be some decades after Massachusetts v. Mellon
before the Court articulated the modern guideposts for Article III

4. States may well have an interest — and suffer a particularized
and concrete injury — when Congress improperly compels them to
legislate, as was true in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(striking down a federal law on Tenth Amendment commandeering
grounds in a suit brought by a state plaintiff). But those cases only
prove the point, for the injury there is suffered directly by the state, and
is not a generalized injury to the state’s citizens that the state seeks to
litigate on their behalf. Whether a criminal defendant may rely upon
the Tenth Amendment, see, e.g., United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128 (3d
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010) (No. 09-1227), it is settled
the private plaintiffs may not. See, e.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143–44 (1939).
14
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standing, Justice Sutherland’s analysis on this point might best be
understood as going to the existence vel non of a sufficiently
particularized injury in fact to satisfy the case-or-controversy
requirement. Put another way, “[t]he Court’s refusal to allow states to
litigate their Governing Interests also reinforced the constitutional
requirement, grounded in the separation of powers, that federal courts
hear only cases and controversies.” Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at
440; see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
dissenting) (“The Supreme Court’s decisions about suits over
“generalized grievances” are closely related to Massachusetts v.
Mellon . . . .”). 5
c.

Even as the Supreme Court’s Approach to State
Standing Has Liberalized in Suits Against Private
Parties and Other States, the Mellon Rule Has Remained
Sacrosanct

5. Thus, even when then-Judge Scalia suggested in Maryland
People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1985), that Congress
in some circumstances should be able to confer parens patriae standing
upon the states in suits against the federal government, his selfdescribed “narrow” opinion emphasized the extent to which the
separation of powers both (1) barred such suits without federal
legislation; and (2) might in some instances bar such legislation, as
well. See id. at 321–22. Needless to say, no federal statute authorizes
Virginia’s suit in this case.
15
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Finally, although the Court has since recognized broader
circumstances in which states can act as parens patriae of their citizens
in suits against private entities or other states, see, e.g., Georgia, 324
U.S. at 447, it has consistently reaffirmed the bar on parens patriae
suits against the federal government, see, e.g., id. at 446. Nowhere is
this distinction more apparent than the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision
in Snapp, which recognized Puerto Rico’s standing to sue Virginia apple
growers on a claim that the defendants had violated federal law by
refusing to honor a preference for U.S. workers over temporary foreign
workers. See 458 U.S. 592. Treating Puerto Rico as a “state,” see id. at
608 n.15, the 8-0 Court concluded that it had standing to proceed, even
as it expressly distinguished suits against the federal government, see
id. at 610 n.16 (“Here, . . . the Commonwealth is seeking to secure the
federally created interests of its residents against private defendants.”).
A similar distinction was central to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA. Although the Court there recognized a state’s
standing to challenge federal administrative action (or, more precisely,
the lack thereof), Justice Stevens’s opinion emphasized the “critical
difference between allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from the
16
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operation of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits) and
allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has
standing to do).” 549 U.S. at 520 n.17 (quoting Georgia, 324 U.S. at 447)
(emphasis added); see also id. (“Massachusetts does not here dispute
that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens; it rather seeks to assert its
rights under the Act.”).6 Indeed, the linchpin of the Court’s standing
analysis was that rising sea levels would directly injure Massachusetts’
proprietary interests as a coastal property owner. See id. at 522–23; see
also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER ’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 265 (6th ed. 2009).
In short, even as the Supreme Court has greatly increased the
ability of states to sue both other states and private parties to vindicate
“quasi-sovereign interests,” and even as it has allowed suits against the
federal government to vindicate states’ statutory interests created by
Congress, it has held fast to the Mellon rule as a categorical bar on pure
parens patriae suits against the federal government. States simply do

6. The Court’s analysis may also have reflected the view that
Congress had specifically authorized Massachusetts’ suit. See
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 514 n.16.
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not have a sovereign interest sufficient to confer standing anytime the
federal government is alleged to have exceeded its constitutional power.
II.

STATE LAW CANNOT CREATE STANDING MERELY BY PURPORTING
TO EXEMPT STATE CITIZENS FROM FEDERAL LAW
Conceding the continuing force of the Mellon bar, Virginia

contends — and the district court held — that it nevertheless has a
sufficient interest to support standing because of the conflict between
the individual mandate and Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act. The
argument, in short, is that Virginia is not proceeding as parens patriae,
but is rather seeking to vindicate its unique interest in enforcing the
(otherwise preempted) state law. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari Before Judgment at 7, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
No. 10-1014 (U.S. filed Feb. 8, 2011). As cases identifying valid
sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests show, however, the distinction
on which this argument rests is without a difference.
a. Quasi-Sovereign Interests Only Include Protecting the
Health and Well-Being of Citizens and Preventing
Discriminatory Treatment Within the Federal System
As noted above, the Supreme Court since Massachusetts v. Mellon
has to some degree relaxed the constraints on the ability of states to sue
in some circumstances. Further to that end, the Court has articulated
18
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criteria pursuant to which states might have a “quasi-sovereign”
interest sufficient to satisfy both Article III and prudential standing
considerations, at least in suits against private parties or other states.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (“In that
capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last
word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and
its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”).
Tellingly, though, in none of these cases did the Supreme Court
ever suggest that a state could use such a “quasi-sovereign” interest to
sue the federal government; quite to the contrary. See, e.g., Snapp, 458
U.S. at 610 n.16. Nor has any case suggested that a state could create
such a “quasi-sovereign” interest merely by exempting its citizens from
compliance with applicable federal law, and for good reason. Absent
circumstances such as those identified in cases like Georgia v.
Pennsylvania Railroad and Snapp, “the State is only a nominal party
without a real interest of its own,” id. at 600, and allowing standing
would be tantamount to allowing the exact kind of suit that Mellon
forbids. See id. at 602 (“A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently
19
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concrete to create an actual controversy between the State and the
defendant.”).
Thus, even against non-federal defendants, the Court in Snapp
identified only two sets of circumstances in which states may in fact
have a “quasi-sovereign” interest sufficient to confer standing: “First, a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being —
both physical and economic — of its residents in general. Second, a
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily
denied its rightful status within the federal system.” Id. at 607.
b. A State Does Not Have an Independent Interest in
Seeking to Protect Its Citizens from the Operation of
Federal Law
Nothing in Snapp, or in any other Supreme Court decision before
or since, suggests that states have a similar interest in protecting their
citizens from federal law, especially in suits against federal defendants.
After all, states cannot have an interest in protecting their citizens from
the operation of valid federal laws, since those laws are “the supreme
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also
Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)
20
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(“When Congress . . . adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all
the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as
much the policy of [a state] as if the act had emanated from its own
legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the
state.”).
It necessarily follows that, even if a quasi-sovereign interest could
support standing in a suit against the federal government, a state
cannot claim a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from
allegedly invalid federal laws. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S.
at 446–47 (explaining that quasi-sovereign interests do not extend to
suits “where a State sought to protect her citizens from the operation of
federal statutes”). A contrary conclusion would be patently
irreconcilable with Mellon, Texas v. ICC, and the litany of additional
cases in which the Supreme Court rejected the argument that states
may sue the federal government on claims that the latter exceeded its
constitutional authority in its regulation of individuals.
c.

States Cannot Create a Quasi-Sovereign Interest by
Purporting to Exempt State Citizens from Federal Law

Nor is the above analysis altered by the suggestion that a state
might have a quasi-sovereign interest in defending the applicability of
21
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state law as against an allegedly invalid federal law. To be sure, Snapp
reiterated the state’s sovereign (not “quasi-sovereign”) interest in “the
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the
relevant jurisdiction,” which “involves the power to create and enforce a
legal code, both civil and criminal.” 458 U.S. at 601. But that (by then
well-established) interest goes only to a state’s power to ensure that its
laws are followed by those who are bound to comply. See, e.g.,
Woolhandler & Collins, supra, at 422–23. The state’s interest in
enforcing its legal code must necessarily give way to federal law
whenever a conflict arises, all the more so because the existence of a
conflict in no way bears upon the underlying constitutionality of the
federal law.
To that end, no part of the Court’s analysis in Snapp or any other
case can fairly be read to suggest that a state could create a quasisovereign interest simply by creating a conflict. “A state cannot by
creating an agency for the purpose of making life better in the state
obtain a legal interest in every transaction to which an entity within
the state is a party.” Ill. Dep’t of Transp. v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373
(7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.).
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It is therefore bootstrapping to conclude that “‘Federal regulatory
action that preempts state law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact to
satisfy [Snapp].’” Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (quoting Wyoming ex
rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008)). It is
not the fact of preemption that might inflict a sufficiently concrete
injury upon the state to confer standing, but the unique nature of the
state interest with which the federal law arguably interferes.7 Absent
some more specific quasi-sovereign, proprietary, or private interest
arising out of the application of federal law, states may not sue the
federal government simply to protect their citizens from allegedly
unconstitutional laws.

7. This conclusion may help to explain the Supreme Court’s
observation in Franchise Tax Board that “[t]here are good reasons why
the federal courts should not entertain suits by the States to declare the
validity of their regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law.
States are not significantly prejudiced by an inability to come to federal
court for a declaratory judgment in advance of a possible injunctive suit
by a person subject to federal regulation.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983); see also Kevin C.
Walsh, The Ghost That Slew the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (arguing that Franchise Tax Board precludes federal
jurisdiction where, as here, states seek a declaratory judgment that
state law is not preempted because the conflicting federal law is
unconstitutional).
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THE DISTRICT COURT’S HOLDING THAT VIRGINIA HAS STANDING
WOULD HAVE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR JUSTICIABILITY
DOCTRINE
a. The District Court Rested Virginia’s Standing Solely on
the Conflict Between State and Federal Law
As noted above, the district court concluded that Virginia has

standing because of the conflict between the individual mandate and
Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1,
which provides that:
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of
whether he has or is eligible for health insurance coverage
under any policy or program provided by or through his
employer, or a plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the
federal government, shall be required to obtain or maintain
a policy of individual insurance coverage except as required
by a court or the Department of Social Services where an
individual is named a party in a judicial or administrative
proceeding.
What should be clear from the text of the statute is that it is not a
criminal provision of the Virginia code, nor is it a law that reflects
Virginia’s quasi-sovereign interest in either “the health and well-being
— both physical and economic — of its residents in general” or “in not
being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal
system.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. The law creates no penalties, nor does
it impose any obligations on (or barriers to conduct by) private citizens,
24
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who remain free “to privately contract for health insurance for family
members or former family members.” Instead, the law exempts Virginia
citizens from a requirement that, practically, could only be imposed by
the federal government. Put simply, the statute serves no sovereign or
quasi-sovereign interest other than to provoke a conflict with federal
law.
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the existence of a
conflict between the individual mandate and the Virginia Health Care
Freedom Act is sufficient to confer standing upon Virginia. See Sebelius,
702 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07. Invoking the Tenth Circuit’s “principled and
logical reasoning” in Wyoming, see id. at 607, the court concluded that
Virginia, through its Attorney General, satisfies the standing
requirements of Article III.
As the above analysis suggests, however, the mere fact of
preemption is not — and cannot be — sufficient to create a sovereign or
quasi-sovereign interest supporting Virginia’s standing to challenge the
constitutionality of federal regulation. And although the district court
heavily relied upon it, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wyoming is not to
the contrary. As was true in Massachusetts v. EPA, Wyoming’s suit was
25
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specifically authorized by the APA. See 539 F.3d at 1242–44. The
question presented to the Tenth Circuit was only whether the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
interpreting a federal statute; like Massachusetts before it, Wyoming
was asserting its statutory rights under federal law.8
In that regard, it is telling that the district court in this case
provided no additional analysis of, or explanation for, how the
individual mandate affects Virginia’s sovereign interests as distinct
from the interests of her citizens; its standing analysis rises and falls on
the simple but incorrect conclusion that a claim of preemption will
always suffice to confer upon the state an interest sufficient to
challenge the constitutionality of the conflicting federal law.

8. To similar effect, the two circuit decisions on which the Wyoming
court relied in holding that preemption is sufficient to confer standing
also involved situations where states were suing federal agencies for
failing to comply with federal statutes. See Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Congress has expressly
contemplated that States may be heard to complain of injury inflicted
by the Orders.”); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 766
F.2d 228, 233 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The threatened injury to a State’s
enforcement of its safety laws is within the zone of interests of the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act.”).
26
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b. Such Reasoning Would “Make a Mockery” of the Case-orControversy Requirement
Because the district court rested Virginia’s standing on the mere
existence of a conflict between federal and state law, and identified no
freestanding injury to any other quasi-sovereign or proprietary interest,
its holding allows for no principled distinction between this suit and any
other in which a state would use preemption as the basis for standing to
bring a constitutional challenge to federal law. Nor is there any logical
distinction between such a suit and one in which the state’s objection
sounded purely in the applicability of a federal statute — not that the
conflicting federal statute was unconstitutional, but merely that it did
not actually preempt state law. Such overbroad and cursory analysis, if
allowed to stand, would create three distinct problems for contemporary
standing doctrine.
First, allowing states to challenge the constitutionality of federal
laws by creating a statutory conflict with state law would provide an
all-too-effective end-run around Mellon, since it would reduce the
Supreme Court’s bar on parens patriae suits against the federal
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government to cases in which there is no positive state law with which
the challenged federal action is in tension.9
Second, to the extent that Mellon reflects deeper principles about
Article III standing, including the bar on generalized grievances and
the requirement that the plaintiff suffer a concrete, particularized
injury, a rule that allows states to sue the federal government whenever
there is a conflict between state and federal law would risk vitiating
those requirements altogether in any instance in which a conflict is
alleged to exist. Indeed, if a putative conflict between state and federal
law itself sufficed to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of standing
analysis, see Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 607, there would be no way of
ensuring that the challenged federal law actually injured an individual
party; the existence of standing would be governed simply by the
abstract — and quite possibly hypothetical — conflict between state and
federal law. See, e.g., Bickel, supra, at 90 (“Time and again, precisely
like a council of revision, the Court would be pronouncing the

9. Even this distinction might prove illusory; federal law in most
relevant cases will displace at least some state law, such as state tort
law in the case of federal law governing the manufacture of medical
devices. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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abstraction that some law generally like the one before it would or
would not generally be constitutional in the generality of its
applications.”).
In addition to prematurely (and perhaps unnecessarily) involving
the courts in a political dispute, such a result would also fly in the face
of the Court’s repeated admonition that “we must carefully inquire as to
whether [plaintiffs] have met their burden of establishing that their
claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise
judicially cognizable.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 820.
Third, and perhaps counterintuitively, “expansive state standing
has a serious potential to undermine rather than complement
individual standing in constitutional cases,” Woolhandler & Collins,
supra, at 396; see also id. at 504 (“[I]ncreased state standing could
potentially undermine individual standing to litigate individual and
structural constitutional guaranties.”), both because it would prioritize
claims by states over those of individuals and because of the likelihood
that it would be “majority reinforcing,” placing into tension “[t]he
freedom of government” and “the freedom from government.” See id. at
483. In other words, a doctrine that allows states to sue in virtually any
29
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instance of conflict with federal law would short-circuit the principal
means through which majorities have traditionally exercised control
over the scope of federal power — at the ballot box — and come at the
expense of those parties who historically have been left to the courts to
vindicate their rights.
c.

Preemption-Based Standing Would Also Incentive State
Attempts to Impermissibly Nullify Federal Laws

Finally, it bears noting that Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act is
hardly the first — or most aggressive — recent attempt by a state to
manufacture a conflict with federal law. Idaho’s Health Freedom Act
goes even further, providing that
The power to require or regulate a person’s choice in
the mode of securing health care services, or to impose a
penalty related thereto, is not found in the Constitution of
the United States of America, and is therefore a power
reserved to the people pursuant to the Ninth Amendment,
and to the several states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment.
The state of Idaho hereby exercises its sovereign power to
declare the public policy of the state of Idaho regarding the
right of all persons residing in the state of Idaho in choosing
the mode of securing health care services free from the
imposition of penalties, or the threat thereof, by the federal
government of the United States of America relating thereto.
IDAHO CODE § 39-9003(1) (2010); see also THOMAS E. WOODS, JR.,
NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
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122–23 (2010) (quoting the Idaho law and invoking it as a model for
future state efforts to nullify allegedly unconstitutional federal laws).
In one sense, these efforts may reflect “the political reality that a
smaller unit of government is more likely to have a population with
preferences that depart from the majority’s. It is, therefore, more likely
to try an approach that could not command a national majority.”
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1987) (book review). But that only
further undermines the argument that such conflicts should create
standing, for it would inevitably lead to multifarious efforts to challenge
federal legislation from every direction, and by every constituency.10 As
Professor Bickel warned, “It would make a mockery . . . of the
constitutional requirement of case or controversy . . . to countenance
automatic litigation — and automatic it would surely become — by

10. In February 2011, for example, the Arizona Senate passed S.B.
1178 (the “Intrastate Commerce Act”), which provides that all services
performed within Arizona, and all goods grown or made in the state for
consumption within the state, “are not subject to the authority of
Congress under its constitutional power to regulate commerce among
the several states.” The bill also imposes substantial fines for state or
federal officers who attempt to enforce federal laws that are
inconsistent with those proscriptions.
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states situated no differently” than Virginia is here. Bickel, supra, at
89–90.
Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act does not expressly “nullify”
federal law. But it was enacted to invite the same result, albeit via
judicial invalidation rather than outright nullification. To allow
standing based solely on the existence of such statutes is to take up
such an invitation, and to involve the courts in an enterprise that
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement was specifically intended
(and has long been interpreted) to keep them out of.
*

*

*

Ultimately, whether or not the individual mandate is a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s Article I powers is an important
question, but one that does not turn in any meaningful way on state
laws purporting to exempt state citizens from its operation. If the
individual mandate is constitutional, then these state laws will all fall
under the Supremacy Clause. If the individual mandate is not
constitutional, then it will fall regardless of whether it conflicts with
any state laws. Even at its broadest, standing doctrine has never
encompassed such an undifferentiated, unspecific, and ultimately
32
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irrelevant injury to state law. To allow such a suit to proceed here
would be to sanction a practice that the text, purpose, and history of the
Constitution expressly forbid, and
would be a fundamental denial of perhaps the most
innovating principle of the Constitution: the principle that
the federal government is a sovereign coexisting in the same
territory with the states and acting, not through them, like
some international organization, but directly upon the
citizenry, which is its own as well as theirs.
Bickel, supra, at 89.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully submit that
the district court’s decision be vacated and remanded with instructions
to dismiss for lack of standing.
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